

**THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE**

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

DDI 7344-82  
13 September 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence  
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: Charles E. Waterman, NIO/NESA

SUBJECT: Interagency Coordinating Meeting on Lebanon, 10 September

This meeting was called by Ambassador Morris Draper as a follow-on to the Interagency Steering Group attended by the DDCI on 3 September. Draper, who was in an extremely positive mood about the prospects for future progress on this issue, briefed on a number of salient issues, as follows:

- He will be returning to the area by 14 September, and has named FSO Chris Ross to accompany him as deputy. Phil Habib will be returning for the presidential inauguration on 23 September, and probably travel to a number of area states at that time.
- The entire complex of problems surrounding Lebanon is to be kept separate from the President's Palestinian initiative - although there is a connection. The President had promised continued personal involvement.
- The objective for the next phase is to bring about "simultaneous" withdrawals of Israeli, Syrian, and Palestinian forces from areas now occupied by them "by Winter." The words in quotes will not be used publicly, however. As the first step in this phase, he will attempt to negotiate a "limited deployment". Regarding the problem of PLO in the north and northern Biqa, Draper notes that Israeli statistics put these forces at lower strength (about 5000) than we do (about 13,000). Draper also notes that some of these forces might be persuaded to assimilate (without arms) as opposed to relocate. (Comment: I personally am less optimistic than Draper appears to be about the possibility for rapid success in this withdrawal procedure, but this meeting was not the place to voice such reservations. I believe strong PLO elements will wish to relocate in the north.)

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NSC review completed.

State Dept. review completed.

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
- He will be exploring with the Israelis and Lebanese the various concepts of a buffer zone in South Lebanon. Among the options -- expanded UNIFIL with new rules of engagement, MFO, or the Israeli preferred autonomous status of local forces such as Haddad and certain Shia -- President Reagan wishes to push the first option. He has also absolutely ruled out US participation in an MFO. Draper is not sanguine about the possibilities of success with the Israelis regarding UNIFIL, but did request the appropriate State personnel present to develop a new mandate for a UNIFIL force and new rules of engagement. He also requested preparation of a backup MFO concept paper with new ideas, such as making it responsible to the Government of Lebanon.
- A key first issue is to reduce Israeli visibility in the Beirut area, while allowing them to preserve their minimum requirement -- which is a continued presence on the Beirut-Damascus road, from Alayh to the Syrian lines. The Lebanese have proposed the Israelis commence using a backroad support network starting at Damur, south of Beirut. Draper plans to press this with the Israelis upon return.
- Draper notes USG influence with Bashir Jumayyil is extremely high-across the board. Habib personally feels, with all his faults, that Bashir is the only Lebanese who is in a position to "do the job" at this time. Israeli pressure on him to sign a peace treaty is intense, however, and "out of hand" inside Israel. The impact of such an event on potential Arab assistance is obvious.
- Draper noted the planned 1 October DOD survey team, and the absolute necessity to set military assistance level at a politically acceptable high level. He personally suggests \$100 million/year, but the practicality of this was contested by security assistance specialists present. He also made a pitch for highest quality DATT personnel to be assigned in Lebanon, and consideration of the establishment of a MAAG in-country. Although French military advisors are already in place, French policy with the Palestinians during the crisis has rendered them less politically acceptable to the current Lebanese government. We envisage taking over the major role. Draper noted the relatively low state of competence to which Lebanese G-2 has fallen, and asked DOD to plan rebuilding this organization.

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-- A long discussion on reconstruction financial needs ensued, with Treasury officials commenting they still have no idea - even after recent IBRD meetings in Toronto - if Kuwait and Saudi Arabia will contribute and at what level.

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A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Charles E. Waterman", is written over a light background.

Charles E. Waterman

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